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Abstract.
A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states that decentral-
isation oﬀers the possibility to learn from local or regional policy experiments. We
argue that such learning processes are not trivial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters
have an inherent tendency to retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which
was costly to accumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well
particularly for complex issues if representatives’ actions are tightly controlled by the
electorate. Decentralisation provides improved learning processes compared to unitary
systems, but the results we can expect are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing
and utilising knowledge often described in the literature.
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In one of his most often-cited papers, Hayek (1968) argues that competition on
the marketplace serves as a “discovery procedure” for new, previously unknown
problem-solving routines. This argument, which is probably more or less undis-
puted with regard to the market for private goods – see, for instance, Kerber
and Saam (2001) and the literature cited there – has recently also been proposed
with regard to public goods: Competition between jurisdictions is supposed to
provide incentives both to conduct experiments with new policy routines and to
learn from experiments conducted in other jurisdictions. This basic argument has,
for example, been made by Salmon (1987), Vihanto (1992) as well as Vanberg
and Kerber (1994). In spite of growing interest, the observation made by Oates
(1999), that this is still a relatively little researched problem, appears to remain
valid to date. There are a number of contributions concerned with the general
question if political competition induces representatives to experiment with novel
policies (e.g. Rose-Ackermann 1980, Kollman et al. 2000, Strumpf 2002). While
these contributions come to conﬂicting results regarding representatives’ reactions
to political competition, they all tend to put emphasis on the decision-making of
politicians, while our focus in the present paper is on the question: Do parallel
political experiments in multiple jurisdictions lead to better informed voters?
The above-mentioned contributions have another, not always explicitly made, as-
sumption in common, namely the assumption that individuals have some motiva-
tion to gather information on institutional evolution or on the evolution of economic
policy in other jurisdictions, and to update their knowledge accordingly. In the con-
tribution by Vanberg and Kerber (1994), for instance, this motivation is explained
by referring to the private gains that can be accrued from eﬃciency-enhancing in-
stitutional change. This is certainly very plausible when we are interested in in-
dividuals considering their “exit”-option: If an individual considers herself mobile
and has the option of leaving jurisdiction A for jurisdiction B, and if she can gather
information about B at very low cost, then she obviously has an incentive to in-
form herself about the real disposable income that she can earn in B. This incentive
1disappears, however, when the option of mobility does not exist and the only re-
maining option is “voice”. In this case and from the perspective of a single voter
among many, a change of policy is a pure, Samuelsonian public good. If there is
not a suﬃciently high probability for a single voter to cast the decisive vote, and
if there are no external rewards for her changing her mind, then the individual has
no obvious incentive to burden the costs to update her given, individual stock of
economic policy-related knowledge. She is rationally ignorant in a Downsian sense
and has, behind a veil of insigniﬁcance, no incentive to invest resources into holding
the scientiﬁcally most accurate point of view. This problem, however, seems to be
widely neglected in most of the available literature on political competition.
This confronts us with a seemingly paradoxical theoretical question: How do ratio-
nally ignorant voters learn, who in a strict sense do not have any incentives to learn
at all? At this point, we do not want to engage in a fundamental discussion re-
garding the appropriateness of Bayesian learning as a modeling technique in general
(for a thorough discussion of that, see e.g. Hodgson 1997 and the literature cited
there). But we believe the conclusion to be straightforward that it is not the ap-
propriate choice under the particular incentive structure sketched above. The costs
involved with Bayesian updating, be it in terms of cognitive costs in information
processing, or in terms of the costs of gathering information, appear to be prohib-
itively high given that the private gains of this procedure are essentially nil here.
We therefore decide to model learning as a collective, social communication process
which requires next to no eﬀort at all on behalf of the single voter. Arguing from
there, it will be shown that important implications for the theoretical concept of de-
centralised economic policy-making as a discovery procedure arise. Under plausible
parameter conﬁgurations, learning from decentralised political experiments may not
occur at all, or, which is a result that is new to the literature, political experimenta-
tion may occur only in the wrong (the relatively eﬃcient) jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
it is argued that even under such unfavourable conditions, decentralised policy still
oﬀers more scope for expanding the stock of knowledge in the long run than cen-
tralised policy.
2To be able to focus on collective learning processes involving voters and citizens, we
assume a tightly controlled government throughout the paper. The policies preferred
by the majority of voters are executed frictionlessly and there are no control problems
to be solved. In the present framework with its emphasis on uncertainty regarding
the true model of the economy, an alternative approach could assume that, like
their counterparts in private ﬁrms, politicians can engage in cognitive leadership
(Witt 1998). This would be a plausible extension of the model developed in this
paper, but to keep the analysis tractable, we will restrict ourselves to allow only
collective learning of voters at this time.1 The argument will proceed as follows: In
the following section, the dissipation of policy-related theories within a population
will be modelled as a frequency-dependent process leading to a stable equilibrium
with a clear-cut majority theory. Section 3 introduces a hypothetical, yet very
general starting point for factor migration as well as a distinction between loyal and
perfectly mobile individuals. Section 4 discusses the incentives following from factor
migration to critically examine given policy routines and to experiment with new
routines. Finally, Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2. Individual uncertainty and the emergence of common beliefs
2.1. The dissemination of policy-related conjectures. The point of departure
of the argument presented here is fundamentally diﬀerent from that of approaches
to ﬁscal competition which involve omniscient maximisers of welfare, rents or some-
thing alike and ask whether such a maximising eﬀort by a number of decentralised
social planners leads to a result that would be considered optimal by an omniscient,
centralised social planner. Instead of following this lead, the notion of model un-
certainty is used here: individuals are theoretically uncertain in the sense that they
do not know the true model describing the actual properties of the economy within
which they are acting and making decisions.
1A discussion of the normative aspects of public entrepreneurship can be found in Schnellenbach
2007.
3Because the quality of economic policy is a public good and because we assume that
there is a large number of citizens, so that the individual probability of having the
decisive vote is approximately zero, individuals do not feel a need to invest into ac-
quiring “rational expectations” regarding economic policy, i.e. to utilise all available
information in order to gain the most precise theoretical and empirical knowledge
about their economy that can be gained at a given point in time. Individuals might
be expected to build rational expectations if the necessary information was available
costlessly and if it could be learned eﬀortlessly. But both requirements are not met
here.
Following Hirschman (1989), however, it is assumed that individuals do feel an
intrinsic need to have some point of view on issues of economic policy – but, given
the public good problem, they do not feel a need to take the scientiﬁcally most up
to date point of view. On the contrary, it is assumed that, once individuals have
learned a set of conjectures about diﬀerent economic policy measures, they will
attempt to retain them. To explain this tendency, assume that at a time t = 0, a
representative individual is completely uncertain and has no a priori knowledge at all
to fortify an opinion on economic policy. Given her assumed intrinsic need for such
an explanation, she will acquire some theory Ωn ∈ {Ω1,...,ΩN} that is supplied to
her in the public discourse. The supply side of the theory market is not explicitly
modelled here. Following Lord Keynes’ famous quote that “Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual inﬂuences, are usually
the slaves of some defunct economist” (Keynes 1936, chapter 24), one may simply
assume that every Ωn has been introduced by economists into the public discourse.
This admittedly arbitrary assumption is of course unsatisfactory from the point of
view that a theory on economic evolution ought to explain not only the relevant
communication (replication) and selection mechanisms, but also the emergence of
variety, in our cases a variety of theories, in the ﬁrst place (see Hodgson and Knudsen
2006). However, treating this stage explicitly would render the argument presented
in this paper much more complex, and at the same time add little to understanding
the core question of learning from political experiments. Thus, we believe that the
simplifying assumption is warranted here.
4As a preliminary to explaining the choice of an Ωn by an arbitrary individual, we
assume for simplicity that citizens are homogeneous with regard to their maximand.
They all wish to maximise the same objective of economic policy, which in our case
is the level of disposable income, but it might just as well be employment, output
growth rates or something alike. Since we focus on the general learning process about
economic policy measures and not on some speciﬁc, well-deﬁned policy problem, we
do not need to concern ourselves with the details of the maximisation problem
here and can simply assume that there is a common maximisation problem which
concerns economic policy-makers and citizens.
In this case, a plausible criterion for choosing one Ωn among a possibly large num-
ber N > 0 of available sets is the number of individuals who are already convinced
that Ωn gives an accurate description of the true working properties of the economy.
If one is completely uncertain about the relative accuracy of the N > 0 available
theories, then the number of individuals who already hold an Ωn may be interpreted
as a signal for its usefulness relative to the other theories. It also may be the case
that the uncertain citizen decides upon choosing an Ωn following personal commu-
nication with other, already decided individuals. In this case, the probability that
the uncertain individual communicates with an individual advocating Ωn will usu-
ally rise with the fraction of already decided individuals who adhere to that set of
conjectures.
Thus, it should be possible to model the individual selection of a set of conjectures
about economic policy as a frequency-dependent process:2 A relatively large number
of individuals who already hold an Ωn reassures an uncertain individual that Ωn is
not an obscure, but a reasonable choice. One tool among others to model such
processes of frequency-dependent self-organisation is the generalised Polya process,
2To some degree, there is obviously a similarity to Kuran (1987) here, in the sense that individ-
uals decide on taking a certain position according to the number of other individuals who already
hold that position. The important diﬀerence, however, is that in our model there is no place for
preference falsiﬁcation: There is no diﬀerence between what individuals privately believe in and
what they publicly advocate. Nevertheless, the result, for which Kuran coined the term “collective
conservativism”, will be quite similar.
5as proposed by Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1983, 1987). The essence of this

























t ) = 1 (1)
which simply states that the expected value of the fraction 0 ≤ wn
t+1 ≤ 1 of indi-
viduals in the population of already decided individuals who adhere to an Ωn at a
time t + 1, given its fraction at a time t, depends primarily on just that wn
t and on
an arbitrary, upward-sloping function qn
t (wn
t ). Time in this model is equal to the
number of individuals who have decided themselves, i.e., it is assumed that at any
point in time exactly one individual decides which theory to choose. The parame-
ter m stands for the number of individuals who were already decided at t = 0 and
henceforth, we will simply assume m = N, with the underlying assumption that
every Ω is backed by exactly one individual at t = 0. From (1), the condition for
an equilibrium is easily inferred. Beyond identifying the necessary condition for an
equilibrium, existence has been proved in the original work by Arthur, Ermoliev and
Kaniovski.
Lemma 1. With qn
t being deﬁned as a non-negative and non-decreasing function of
wn
t , there must exist at least one ﬁxed point with E[wn
t+1|wn
t ] − wn
t = 0, with each
ﬁxed point satisfying qn
t (wn
t ) − wn
t = 0.
Proof. See Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1983). 
2.2. Choice and equilibria on a theory market with heterogeneous indi-
viduals. The piece that is still missing in our depiction of the market for theories
on economic policy is a set of assumptions on the shape of the function qn
t (wn
t ),
assigning a probability for the next uncertain individual to choose Ωn to the current
market share of this theory, wn
t . If individuals at any point in time deterministically
chose that Ωn with the highest current market share, matters would be rather
simple: The ﬁrst individual at t = 0 would choose randomly one theory to become
the most-frequented one, and unconstrained herding behaviour would lead all
6subsequently deciding individuals to choose exactly the same. The process would
be locked in on a path towards a stable equilibrium with wn
t = 1 for the majority
theory, immediately after the ﬁrst individual has made her random decision. Ob-
viously, the resulting complete consensus among individuals regarding their beliefs
about the proper economic policy contradicts even casual empirical evidence.
As an alternative, consider the situation when individuals are heterogeneous regard-
ing their tendency to follow the majority. Let α denote the individual tendency to
be conformist, with an α ∈ (−∞,0] signifying a strictly conformist individual who
does always and uncompromisingly choose the majority opinion and an α ∈ [1,∞)
signiﬁying a strictly nonconformist individual who always and uncompromisingly
refuses to take the majority opinion. Values of α ∈ (0,1) reﬂect diﬀerent degrees
of conformism, with the actual choice depending on w. For example, an individual
with a relatively high value of α just below unity is a relatively non-conformist
individual by nature, but a very high wn
t may still convince her to join the majority.
Nonconformists are thus not completely deterred by large groups with an internal
consensus – they just need a relatively bigger consensus group to convince them.
When 6 out of 10 individuals report to a non-conformist that they have seen a
black swan, he might remain unconvinced, but when 99 out of 100 report the same,
even he is likely to believe in the existence of a black swan in the neighborhood. In
other words, being a non-conformist is not the same as being intellectual hermit.
On the contrary, a non-conformist is an individual who has a tendency to oppose
the majority, but not an individual who seeks to distinguish himself by holding
a deliberately obscure point of view. Even people who have a strong enough
nonconformist tendency to pick the minority theory have a preference to be in a
larger minority group, rather than a smaller minority group.
Let Ω∗ denote the most popular theory at any given time,
Ω
∗






7If there is no unique Ω∗
t, but a set of equally popular theories, then Ω∗
t is chosen
randomly from this set, with equal probabilities of choice attached to each equally





(1 − α) · w(Ω) if Ω = Ω∗
t
α · w(Ω) if Ω 6= Ω∗
t
(3)
Again, if there is no unique maximum-valued theory but a set of two or more theories
that yield equal values, the individual is assumed to choose randomly with equal
probabilities from the theories in this set.3 With these assumptions made, we can
state
Lemma 2. Let every individual decide on the choice of a theory according to the
following rule: If W := {Ωn ∈ {Ω1,...,ΩN} : argmaxv(Ω)} is a singleton, then the
only Ωn ∈ W will be chosen. If |W| = S > 1, then any Ωn ∈ W will be chosen with
equal probability 1/S. With individuals being heterogeneous with respect to α, the
theory market will eﬀectively collapse to two competing theories, the majority theory
and a preferred minority theory, after a non-conformist choice has been made.
Proof. The ﬁrst individual at t = 1 decides randomly, so that some theory will be-
come Ω∗. As long as the subsequent choices are made by individuals who are suf-
ﬁciently conformist to also pick Ω∗, all other theories Ω 6= Ω∗ have a following of
identical size. When the ﬁrst individual enters who is suﬃciently non-conformist to
decide herself (randomly) for one particular Ωm 6= Ω∗, then it follows straightfor-
wardly from (3) that, due to its greater following, Ωm will be preferred to any other
3Note that the modeling of conformism here is somewhat akin to that of habituation in the
model on the formation of conventions by Hodgson and Knudsen (2004). There, individuals have
an exogenous disposition to follow their habits, but their actual degree of habitually following a
certain routine depends on their decisions of the past. Here, the individual of degree of conformism
follows from some (maybe genetic) disposition, but the decision of a non-conformist to follow the
majority or not depends on the actual size of that majority.
8Ω 6= Ω∗. Therefore, individuals deciding after the ﬁrst non-conformist choice will
eﬀectively always have the choice set {Ω∗,Ωm}. 
All individuals who make a non-conformist decision at later stages of the process will
also choose Ωm, while all individuals making a conformist decision will choose the
majority theory Ω∗. The market shares of all other theories will tend towards zero
with more and more individuals deciding between Ω∗ and Ωm. The reason is that
non-conformism in our model is deﬁned only as a weak aversion against the majority
group, which may even be overcome if the majority group becomes so large that it,
by its sheer size, signals that it is unlikely that the opposition theory is reasonable.
The black swan example above was one illustration, another may be the current
debate about climate change. The sheer relative size of the group of those who
believe in man-made climate change vis-` a-vis the group of climate skeptics might
be interpreted even by relative non-conformist individuals as a signal for a superior
trustworthiness of the hypothesis that climate change is man-made. Were they
confronted with a smaller majority, these moderate non-conformists would decide
to join the camp of climate-skeptics.





(1 − α) · w(Ω∗)
α · w(Ωm),
(3a)
and the α for which an individual is just indiﬀerent between conformism and non-





t→∞ ¯ α = w(Ω
∗). (4)
The convergence in time of ¯ α towards w(Ω∗) follows simply from the fact that, once
they are determined, only the majority theory and the preferred minority theory
are chosen, so that the added market shares of these theories tend towards one.
9That does not mean that the other N − 2 theories that have existed on the theory
market at t = 0 disappear altogether, but they are marginalised and cease to have
a noticeable impact on public discourse.
Knowing this, we can pin down a simple decision rule which connects the individual
propensity to be a conformist with the the relative frequency of the two remaining
theories on the theory market.
Lemma 3. Suﬃciently far into the sorting process on the theory market, individuals
with α < ¯ α ≈ w(Ω∗) will strictly prefer Ω∗ and individuals with α > ¯ α ≈ w(Ω∗) will
strictly prefer Ωm.
Proof. Lemma 3 follows straightforwardly from combining (4) with Lemma 2. 
For those individuals who are exactly indiﬀerent with α = ¯ α, we will make the
assumption that these citizens decide in a conformist fashion. To ﬁnally write down
the q-function of the Polya-process discussed here, suppose that values of α (i.e.,
degrees of conformism) are normally distributed over the population with mean
µ = 0.5 and an arbitrary standard deviation σ. Given the simple decision rule,
we must ﬁnd, for any feasible value of w∗
t the probability that the next individual
drawn from the population has an α ≤ w∗
t. Thus, given our assumption regarding
the distribution of values of α in the population, we can then state that as soon as




























This leads to a characteristic sigmoidal graph for the two q-functions. Given that
there is a positive probability that an individual has an α < 0 or an α > 1, it
follows that q∗
t(0) > 0, q∗
t(1) < 1, qm
t (0) > 0 and ﬁnally qm
t (1) < 1. The exact
10numerical values depend on σ; a rise of σ, would reﬂect a growing number of extreme
conformists and nonconformists in the population. Such a change in the composition
of the population is not modeled in this paper, however: σ is assumed to be constant.
The relationship between the actual fraction w∗
t and the probability q∗
t of the next











Figure 1. Equilibria on the theory market
equilibria for w∗ on this theory market, one at w∗
1 and one at w∗
3. In both cases,
the probability of the next individual choosing Ω∗ is higher than the actual fraction
w∗
t for an interval around w∗
1,3 where w∗
t < w∗
1,3 and lower for an interval where
w∗
t > w∗
1,3. The attracting intervals are delimited by the unstable equilibrium at
w∗
2 = µ = 0.5. For any w∗
t < w∗
2, the process will converge towards w∗
1 and for any
w∗
t > w∗
2 it will converge towards w∗
3. Since Ω∗ has been deﬁned the majority theory
at the outset, we can expect its market share to converge towards w∗
3 without further
interventions into the process; the market share of the preferred minority theory Ωm
will then converge towards wm = 1 − w∗
3.
3. Interjurisdictional labour and capital markets
With the theory market being in place, we can now sketch a simple and very general
two-jurisdiction economy, largely with standard properties. Note that the aim is
deliberately not to use speciﬁc assumptions in order to guarantee unambiguous price
11signals, but to preserve generality by imposing only a few restrictions on the model
economy. Within this model economy, the market signals are produced that are
ultimately processed on the political theory market.
3.1. Loyal versus perfectly mobile individuals. Suppose that every individual
i can be characterised by additively seperable preferences for both income and policy,
Ui(x,y) = yi + u(x) (7)
where u(x) is a positive procedural utility that can be gained from a policy vector x
and that follows not from the outcome of a policy, but from the fact that the policy
vector is in concurrence with the theory Ωi held by the individual. The utility of
the actual outcome of the imposed policy is captured by yi = lT
i + ki, i.e. the
sum of net wage and capital incomes, which will be determined below. Let u(x)
be a step function with u(x) = ¯ u if the individual lives in a jurisdiction where Ωi
determines policy and u(x) = 0 if not. Suppose further that an individual interested
in other jurisdictions would need to invest at least amount of c to gather meaningful
information on foreign income earning opportunities. However, if the jurisdictions
are heterogeneous with regard to their majority theories, the utility ¯ u would be lost
with a relocation. Assuming that i has an inﬁnite time horizon and some a priori
belief regarding the distribution of incomes that can be earned in other jurisdictions,







F) − y − u(x)

> c (8)
where δ > 1 is a discount factor, E(yF) is the expected value of income-earning op-
portunities to be discovered in foreign jurisdictions. It is evident from (8) that, with
all other parameters ﬁxed, there must exist a threshold level of political utility ˆ u
where for all ¯ u ≥ ˆ u an individual abstains completely from gathering information
12about foreign jurisdictions herself. On the other hand, we might also have ¯ u < ˆ u.
These individuals will invest into gathering information about income earning op-
portunities in other jurisdictions and they will migrate whenever they ﬁnd a juris-
diction where the income to be earned is suﬃciently high. From these considera-
tions, we arrive straightforwardly at
Lemma 4. If individuals are suﬃciently heterogeneous regarding either E(yF) −
y, or c, or u(x) or all of these, the population can be separated into two sub-
populations: One loyal group, whose members do not inform themselves about
foreign jurisdictions at all, and one mobile group, whose members inform them-
selves and migrate whenever yF − y is suﬃciently large.
It is useful to further note that individuals who adhere to a minority theory can
be expected to relocate whenever they ﬁnd a foreign jurisdiction oﬀering a yF > y
because for them, u(x) = 0. Even more importantly, note also that not all loyal
individuals need to be satisﬁed with the status quo policy in a jurisdiction. As long
as the discounted expected income diﬀerential is smaller than the costs of searching,
even politically disgruntled individuals will not actively pursue information on policy
outcomes in other jurisdictions. But even if they do and indeed ﬁnd a more lucrative
jurisdiction, they will only actually relocate if the costs of migration are smaller
than the discounted regional utility diﬀerential. Since these magnitudes need not be
identical for all individuals, we can expect that some positive number of politically
disgruntled individuals will remain in their home jurisdiction.
3.2. A signal produced by decentralised policy. To investigate the signals
produced by factor migration, we introduce probably the simplest equilibrium
conditions available in the literature on decentralised ﬁscal policy. We assume that
each individual supplies one unit of homogeneous labor and is endowed with an
arbitrarily high amount of homogeneous capital. Factors are allocated between two
regions, A and B, with the private sectors in both regions being characterised by
standard, neoclassical production functions. Adding to this, we assume that the
vector x = (λ,θ,G) comprises the policy conducted by the public sector with θ
13denoting a head tax, G denoting the quantity of a public good and λ denoting
the technology used to provide the public good. Presuming a perfectly controlled
government which frictionlessly enforces the majority’s preferred policy in order
to suppress control problems, the entire tax revenue is used to provide productive
public goods and no rents are accrued by individuals in the public sector. Public
policy enters the private sector production function through a function ρ(x) with
ρ > 0∀x. The eﬀect of ρ(x) is exactly the same as that of a Hicks-neutral, factor-
augmenting public input, and accordingly the private sector production function
is assumed to be linear-homogeneous. Thus, the complete production function for
each of the two jurisdictions j ∈ {A,B} is
Y = ρ(xj) · F(Lj,Kj). (9)
Individuals are assumed to be uncertain regarding the function ρ(x), and uncertainty
here implies not only parameter uncertainty, but also uncertainty regarding the
functional form of ρ – in other words, individuals act under model uncertainty and
are compelled to act upon fallible hypotheses about the eﬀects of policy changes
on the aggregate output and on the marginal productivities of labour and capital.
While the individuals know that
∂ρ
∂G > 0 and
∂ρ
∂θ < 0, they do not know the exact
functional form and can therefore not simply determine the optimal size of the public
sector in a marginal calculus. Similarly, they know that a higher λ generates higher
incomes than a lower λ, but gathering information about superior technologies of
supplying public goods is, as already mentioned, costly.
Since we assume a perfectly controlled government and exclude rent-seeking activi-
ties, it is evident that the entire tax revenue is used to provide the public good G.
The eﬀective level of G, however, is assumed to also depend upon the technology of
public good provision, which is represented by the technology parameter λ > 0, so
that
G = λθL. (10)
14In essence, the choice of policy can then be reduced to a choice of a tax rate θ
and of a technology λ, with the level of public goods being fully determined by
these parameters. In our context, the term “technology” is supposed to encompass
a wide range of real-world phenomena: not only physical means of production, but
also the composition of a portfolio of diﬀerent types of public goods. For instance,
a relatively low value for λ could signify an excessive emphasis on redistibutive
activities compared to eﬃciency-enhancing public capital, whereas a relatively high
value for λ signiﬁes the opposite. This rather imprecise account of possible inﬂuences
on λ mirrors the problem of model uncertainty that the individuals in the model
face.4
Looking at regions that are eﬀectively small open economies, let the return per unit




r∗. Furthermore, let labour be paid according to its marginal product, such that we







j = lj − θj. (12)
It is important to note that a return per unit of capital at r∗ does not imply that
capital owners are fully informed about the eﬀects of policy in other jurisdictions.
One reason may be that, when deciding where to invest their capital, they observe
only overall rates of return in other jurisdictions and cannot disentangle ex ante how
large the eﬀect of ρ(x) on the rate of return in the foreign jurisdiction is. Another
reason is that even if the eﬀect of ρ(x) were isolated, one would still need to invest
substantial additional eﬀorts into ﬁnding out the details of public policy – remember
4Since the policy-space is not one-dimensional here, involving the choice of λ and θ, this would
traditionally contradict the stability of a median voter equilibrium and therefore the assumption
of a tightly controlled government frictionlessly following the median preferences. Note, however,
that stability here eﬀectively comes from the theory market, where majority preferences are clearly
deﬁned in a stable equilibrium, i.e. λ and θ are determined unambiguously by the choice of an Ω.
15that the simple technology parameter λ represents a possibly very complex real-
world technology of public good provision.
Suppose for simplicity, and without loss of generality, that there are two jurisdictions.
B is the relatively eﬃcient region, i.e., the same amount of public goods is ﬁnanced
in B with a lower tax rate, or a higher amount of public goods is, due to a more
advanced technology, ﬁnanced with the same tax rate in B, compared to A. At the
initial stage, before labour mobility is introduced, we thus have higher net incomes
from labour in the low-tax jurisdiction B, lT
B > lT
A. This is the ﬁrst type of signal
produced by decentralised economic policy, namely a price signal, which sends two
messages: (i) given the current policies, a positive number of units of labour could
be utilised more eﬃciently in B than in A, and (ii) the policies in A and B lead
to diﬀerent incomes from supplying labour. This type of signal will henceforth be
called a diﬀerential signal.
3.3. A signal produced by factor mobility. Recognition of wage diﬀerentials
will induce migration of mobile (but not of loyal) individuals between A and B, and
this will obviously have an eﬀect on lT
A and lT
B. An equilibrium on the interregional
labour and capital markets is reached when both conditions lT
A = lT
B and kA = kB =
r∗ hold simultaneously. However, wage diﬀerentials may be persistent in our model
since, given Lemma 4, the share of mobile individuals is limited and migration might
cease before wages are equalised. Also, note again that the sign of the impact of
migration on lT
A and lT
B is deliberately not determined unambiguously in this model,
as it is probably not fully determined in reality. This can, as we will see shortly,
lead to Scenarios where migration of labour actually increases interjurisdictional



















16and there may exist intervals for Lj where the positive ﬁrst term overcompensates
a bracketed term that is negative on aggregate.5 A migration of productive factors
from the relatively ineﬃcient region A to the relatively eﬃcient region B then leads
to a rise of lA via the direct eﬀect of out-migration on marginal productivity, but it
also leads to less capital being used in A and to a decline of ρ(x) via a loss of tax
revenue. Similarly, an inﬂow of additional units of labour to B will lead to a decline
of marginal labour productivity, but this may be overcompensated by positive eﬀects
generated by additional productive public input ﬁnanced with an enlarged tax base.
It is therefore not ex ante clear whether the net eﬀect of migration on the net incomes
in A and B will be positive or negative. This leads us to
Lemma 5. The net eﬀect of labour migration on the after-tax wages paid in both
regions is generally ambiguous due to the interaction of a direct marginal productivity
eﬀect with an indirect tax base eﬀect.
Four diﬀerent cases, which are summarised in Table 1, can result from migration
between two jurisdictions.
Scenario I II III IV
∂lA
∂LA
> 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
∂lB
∂LB
> 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Table 1: Possible reactions of
wages to factor migration.
While the diﬀerential signal results from given prices, we observe here changing
prices of labour in A and B resulting from a regional shifting of resources. Such
signals associated with price changes will thus be called shift signals.
5Note that it is not feasible to use the capital market equilibrium condition, substitute ρ(x) =
r∗
∂F/∂K into (11) and determine that wages unambiguously decline with the amount of labour used
in the production process. The reason is that with migration, ρ(x) itself changes, at least due to
tax base eﬀects.
17Note that a reliable equilibriating tendency is asscociated only with scenario IV. In
scenario I, there is a clear disequilibriating tendency resulting from factor migration,
and in the other two scenarios the existence of an equilibrium depends on the relative
velocity of the income eﬀects of migration. If the marginal eﬀect of migration on
marginal productivity and on the tax base in B are consistently smaller than that
in A, then there will be a tendency towards an equilibrium, associated with higher
(III) or lower (II) incomes in both A and B. However, given the fact that there is
a group of immobile individuals in our model, factor migration can come to a rest
even with persisting income diﬀerentials.
4. Learning from another jurisdiction’s policies
4.1. Collective learning on the theory market. Picking up the thread of Sec-
tion 2.2, some statements regarding the stability of an equilibrium on the theory
market can be made. Let stability s = s(µ,t) be deﬁned as the absolute number
of individuals who simultaneously need to change their minds in order to transform
the status quo majority theory Ω∗ into a minority theory. Remember that, by def-
inition, the equilibrium frequency of the majority theory Ω∗ must be w∗
3 – as long
as it is indeed favored by the majority. If the value of µ, i.e. of the mean of the
distribution of the non-conformism-parameter α, rises, the population becomes on
average more non-conformist. As a result, the distance w∗
3 − w∗
2 in Figure 1 is re-
duced, so that the attracting region of w∗
3 becomes smaller while the attracting re-
gion of w∗
1, where Ω∗ is transformed into an equilibrium minority theory, is enlarged.
On the other hand, the positive impact of time on the stability of an equilibrium
follows from the technical assumption that at any point in time t exactly one in-
dividual decides which theory she wants to pick. As a result, the frequencies are
stable in equilibrium, but the absolute number s of individuals that need to change
their minds to move the theory market to another equilibrium rises with t. This
may appear to be an unrealistic feature of the model on ﬁrst sight, but it can also be
argued that is helps to approximate the fact that long-conveyed, traditional modes
18of thinking about economic policy are more diﬃcult to change than theories that
have only recently been introduced and that are not as deeply rooted.
Given the approach we have chosen to model the presence of a propensity to be
conformist in the population, it is relatively straightforward to introduce a catalyst
for collective learning processes. The basic question is: In which form can experi-
ence with status quo policies have an impact on the existence and the properties of
particular ﬁxed points. Remember that at the outset, before experience was con-
sidered, µ = 0.5 was assumed, i.e., we assumed individuals to be symmetrically dis-
tributed along the lines of conformism and nonconformism. But it appears to be a
plausible assumption that µ changes when, based upon experience, individuals start
to have reason to believe that Ω∗ is faulty.
If a policy based upon the majority theory produces disappointing results, we should
expect that for individuals who still have to decide themselves, the propensity to
be a conformist is reduced. The more implausible a theory appears in the light of
evidence, the more diﬃcult it becomes ceteris paribus to convince oneself that it is
nevertheless the correct theory. The result is a decline of conformism in the following
sense: An individual who is yet to decide on the theory to pick is characterised by
a given value of α, and would thus have so far needed a certain relative frequency
of w(α) associated with the majority theory to also become convinced of Ω∗. The
more conformist the individual is, the smaller the necessary majority becomes, i.e.
α → 0 implies w(α) → 0.5. But with rising skepticism and a decline of conformism
in the yet-to-decide population, the same individual would experience an increase
of his value of α – he would now only follow a larger, in this sense more convincing,
majority. If such a large majority does not exist, he will instead become a believer
in the minority theory. This leads us to
Proposition 1. If there is a suﬃciently large decline of mean conformism in the
population (a suﬃciently large increase of µ) for a suﬃciently long transitory period
of time (for suﬃciently many individuals to choose a theory in this period of time)
the status quo majority theory becomes the minority theory, and vice versa.
19Proof. Let z = (w∗,q(w∗)) be the status quo ﬁxed point, associated with a frequency
w∗ > 0.5 for Ω∗ and, given that z is a ﬁxed point, q(w∗) = w∗. Let µ increase by
an arbitrarily small, positive ε. This implies that qµ+ε(w∗) < w∗, and given our
assumptions regarding the shape of q(·), z must wander to the left, w∗ − w∗
µ+ε > 0.
Let d = (wd,q(wd)) denote the unstable ﬁxed point which delimits the attracting
regions of the majority ﬁxed point of Ω∗ from the attracting region of the second
ﬁxed point, where Ω∗ would be transformed into the equilibrium minority theory.
It is straightforward that wd = q(wd) = µ at all times, so that with any increase of
µ, d shifts to the right, wd − wd




0∀s > 0. If we repeat this procedure often enough, we will at some stage approach
w∗ − wd = 0. From thereon, and for any further increases of µ, the stable majority
ﬁxed point w∗ ceases to exist. As long as µ does not fall below the critical value
again, the relative frequency of Ω∗ will deteriorate until a lower stable ﬁxed point
is reached, where Ω∗ is now held only by a stable minority. If, after a period of
transitory skepticism, µ bounces back to µ = 0.5, the newly determined status of
Ω∗ as a minority theory is not in jeopardy, since the existence and stability of a
minority ﬁxed point follows directly from our assumption of a normally distributed
α. 
The key to change on the theory market thus is, as one might have expected, disap-
pointing experience with the policies that have been introduced as being in line with
the status quo majority theory. It is, however, important to note that a substan-
tial increase of non-conformism is necessary for this to occur. For only moderate
increases, we will experience a decrease of the majority theory’s market share, and
an accompanying reduction of s = s(µ,t), but it will nevertheless remain the theory
accepted by a majority of voters. We can think of the theories as being supported
by very stable social networks in their ﬁxed points, and these networks can absorb
even relatively large shocks to which the theory market may be exposed. The re-
maining question thus is if, and under which condition, we can expect a shock that
is suﬃciently large to destabilise a given majority theory.
204.2. Learning from diﬀerential signals. What seems particularly appealing
about learning from diﬀerential signals is that individuals can learn from the
policies conducted in neighbouring jurisdictions without the occurrence of any
potentially distorting spatial factor movements. In our framework, however, the
prospects for political learning from diﬀerential signals are dim. We have seen in
the ﬁrst Proposition that a destabilising a given equilibrium on the theory market
requires a substantial, widespread discontent with the status quo in the social
communication processes about policy. Only in this case a suﬃciently strong,
transitory increase of non-conformism will occur to lead enough yet undecided
individuals towards the preferred minority theory such that a reversal of equilibria
on the theory market can take place. However, Lemma 4 informs us that there is
a group of loyal individuals in each jurisdiction who will not invest into gathering
information on policy and political results in the other jurisdiction. Furthermore,
these loyal individuals will be predominantly those who enjoy a high procedural-
political utility u – those who support the incumbent majority theory. In other
words, societal communication processes are dominated by those who support the
status quo and who have an incentive to ignore, rather than spread information
that casts doubt on the status quo.
Even the presence of a very strong and non-mobile non-conformist faction in the
polity does not substantially change this argument. There may be such loyal non-
conformists, if in (8) even with u = 0 the cost component assumes a larger value
than the expected income diﬀerential. However, with the non-conformists being non-
mobile, and acting behind a veil of insigniﬁcance in their domestic political process,
they will not actively invest into receiving and (probably more importantly) correctly
interpreting diﬀerential signals. Mobile non-conformists, on the other hand, migrate
whenever they ﬁnd a large enough income diﬀerential. They produce shift signals,
but do not engage in the domestic discourse on policy. This reasoning leads us
straightforwardly to
21Proposition 2. Diﬀerential signals will generally not suﬃce to destabilise an equi-
librium on the theory market populated by non-mobile individuals acting behind a
veil of insigniﬁcance.
There is some empirical evidence, most prominently provided by Besley and Case
(1995), on political yardstick competition. They show that voters in American
states tend to deny re-election to incumbent governors who raise taxes while their
colleagues in neighbouring jurisdictions do not, while they tend to accept tax raises
when neighbouring governors also raise taxes. Voters appear to interpret a solitary
tax increase as a sign of government waste, or rent-extraction, while a common tax
increase is interpreted as a signal for a real economic necessity of increasing taxes.
This observation supports our initial assumption of tightly controlled governments,
but also seems to indicate that voters do in fact use the diﬀerential signal of tax rate
diﬀerentials. However, the mechanism is shown to fail for other issues of economic
policy: for regionally diﬀering income levels and unemployment rates, Besley and
Case ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the individuals’ voting decisions. This is a
somewhat puzzling result; if voters learn from the comparison of regionally diﬀering
tax policies, and a lone tax raise is deciphered as a sign for ineﬃciency, then why
does the same mechanism not work for other ﬁelds of policy? From the perspective
of our model, two points can be made: (i) the tax rate alone is a very simple signal,
and its isolated interpretation requires little eﬀort compared to the interpretation
of information on the interaction of λ, θ and G; (ii) voters appear to use this signal
for controlling self-interested incumbents, but not to update their knowledge on
economic policy as a whole.6
6Also, evidence on tax mimicking in other countries than the United States indicates that in-
cumbent politicians anticipate the speciﬁc control function of yardstick competition with tax rates.
As for instance Revelli (2001, 2002) shows for the United Kingdom, Heyndels and Vuchelen (1997)
show for Belgium and Feld and Reulier (2005) show for Switzerland, tax increases in neighboring
jurisdictions are often taken as an opportunity to increase taxes at home. For evidence on the
relationship between decentralisation and control of representatives, see also Feld, Schaltegger and
Schnellenbach (2007).
224.3. Learning from shift signals. The argument is substantially diﬀerent for
shift signals. Migration ﬂows have an impact on the net incomes of the loyal
individuals who remain in their home jurisdictions, and it is diﬃcult to ignore a
signal that manifests itself in a change of one’s own budget constraint. Therefore,
suﬃciently large migration between jurisdictions, with suﬃciently large decreases
of the incomes of loyal individuals, can indeed be expected to lead to change the
mood of societal communication processes on economic policy, i.e. to lead to an
increase of skepticism and the mean of non-conformism in the population. However,
Table 1 shows that, if one does not enforce restrictive assumptions, the sign of the
eﬀect of migration out of the relatively ineﬃcient region on net wages is not fully
determined. A larger tax base allowing to ﬁnance more productive infrastructure
may overcompensate the direct eﬀect on marginal labour productivity, or it may
not. In the relatively ineﬃcient region, net incomes may actually rise as a result of
out-migration if the public goods eﬀect does not overcompensate the direct eﬀect
on marginal productivity: Loyal individuals would then experience the shift signal
as a positive loosening of their private budget constraint.
In Table 1, only Scenario I provides unambiguously eﬃcient incentives. Migration
out of the relatively ineﬃcient and into the relatively eﬃcient region leads to higher
net wages in the relatively eﬃcient, and lower net wages in the relatively ineﬃcient
region. As a result, in the region with the relatively ineﬃcient policy, a distortion of
the local theory market can eventually be achieved, and political experimentation
can be conducted in this polity. However, from a standard neoclassical perspective,
Scenario I is the most unlikely one, because in both jurisdictions the tax base eﬀects
would have to overcompensate the standard eﬀects on wages in the production
function. The other Scenarios are associated with perverse incentives for collective
learning in at least one of the two jurisdictions. If Scenarios III or IV occur, the
remaining individuals in the relatively ineﬃcient region experience a raise of their
incomes after labour mobility is implemented. In Scenario IV, the loyal individuals
in the relatively eﬃcient jurisdiction may become convinced to revise their relative
eﬃcient policy due to the “wrong” informational content of the price signal. We
therefore have
23Proposition 3. Shift signals can be expected to destabilise equilibria on the theory
markets if they are suﬃciently strong (if migration ﬂows are suﬃciently broad), but
there is no reason to systematically expect these signals to have the desired eﬀect in,
and only in, the relatively ineﬃcient jurisdiction, where a change of policy would be
unambiguously preferable.
These problems could be reduced if individuals learn from both type of signals
considered here. To also reckon that the level of incomes is higher in B than it is in
A would certainly an improvement compared to an exclusive reliance on shift signals.
This is especially true for the scenarios that imply a further divergence of income
levels, i.e. that do not lead the model economy towards the equilibrium conditions on
the interjurisdictional labour and capital markets, and where migration ﬂows only
end when all mobile individuals have exploited the regional income diﬀerentials.
The additional information would enforce justiﬁed scepticism in A. If there is no
divergence, though, then a convergence of income levels could easily serve as an
argument to defend Ω∗
A: if the income level in B is decreasing, then this can be
easily interpreted as an indicator for an increasing ﬁtness of Ω∗
A relative to Ω∗
B.
Thus, there is generally even more information necessary to ensure that individuals
have the correct incentives. They would need to know the diﬀerential signal, the shift
signal and they would need to reckon that the shift signal follows from migration
and that migration out of A is a sign of relative ineﬃciency of Ω∗
A. This may be
trivial for an economist – but for an individual who defends his set of conjectures
behind a veil of insigniﬁcance and within a stabilising social network, a willingness
to face the facts cannot be simply presupposed.
5. Conclusion and outlook
With all these arguments made, we can nevertheless conclude that from a very long-
run, knowledge-producing perspective, decentralisation still ought to be preferred
to centralisation. Decentralisation delivers a systematic tendency to destabilise
equilibria on the theory market. Even if this does not necessarily occur in the cor-
rect (the ineﬃcient) jurisdiction, a change of Ω∗
B would also produce new knowledge
24about the eﬃcacy of economic policies. A unitary system is missing the inherent
instability that comes with the signals discussed here and is thus bound to produce
less knowledge in the long run. However, we have shown that the problem exists
that incentives to revise a given set of conjectures and thus to experiment with
new policies are not necessarily to be found in the relatively ineﬃcient region.
While more knowledge is produced in decentralised systems, it cannot be ensured
that there is a frictionless diﬀusion process where the relatively eﬃcient policy is
adopted by all jurisdictions.
Somewhat surprisingly, this result has also an encouraging facet, because diversity of
policies is likely to be sustained. We are unlikely to experience ex post harmonisation
towards one eﬃcient policy, but rather an ongoing process where distorted equilibria
on the theory market lead to a continuing revision of theories, which in turn leads
to experiments with new policies. This is encouraging, because eﬃciency in the
model is always only relative eﬃciency vis-` a-vis other jurisdictions. In an ongoing
process of distorted equilibria on the theory market, and experimentation with novel
policies, there is always the prospect of discovering novel policies that are even more
eﬃcient.
Another conclusion is more disturbing from a normative point of view, although not
surprising from an economic point of view. The famous, and highly controversial,
Schumpeter hypothesis states that private entrepreneurs become more innovative,
the larger their market share (see e.g. Witt 2002). A similar implication could
be suspected here, since the tight control of representatives by rationally ignorant
voters is a crucial element of our model. However, while private entrepreneurs,
even if they have market power, are still disciplined to some degree through the
price system, uncontrolled public entrepreneurs in pursuit of self-interested utility
maximisation have a potential to make decisions that are immensely harmful to
voters. Recommending to increase the leeway of representatives in order to facilitate
political innovations would therefore be very premature and, in fact, dangerous (see
Schnellenbach 2007 for a detailed discussion of this issue).
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